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Note
Universally Liable? Corporate-Complicity
Liability Under the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction
Kendra Magraw*
In recent years, courts have begun to rely on universal
jurisdiction to expand traditional jurisdictional powers.
Universal jurisdiction allows a state to prosecute an actor for an
action that occurred outside of its territory, regardless of
whether the actor or action is connected to the prosecuting state
through territoriality or nationality.' Countries exercising
universal jurisdiction have held individuals liable for primary
and complicit criminal acts.' While criminal universal
jurisdiction as applied to individuals is well-established, albeit
* Kendra Magraw is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School.
The Author wishes to thank Professors Fionnula Ni Aolain and David Weissbrodt for
their invaluable, instrumental guidance in developing this Note; Lindsay Moilanen
for her patience and help; the rest of the Journal staff; Joe Cappola for being a
sounding board and editing countless drafts; and her parents for their unwavering
support and advice.
1. E.g., Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging
Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 143 (2006) ("[B]y
the principle of universal jurisdiction, international law has long recognized that a
state may exercise jurisdiction over a limited category of conduct even without a
connection by territory, nationality, or need for protection.").
2. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal
Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311-13 (2001) (discussing the case against
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for his role in the murder and disappearance of
thousands of people); Trial Watch, Frans Van Anraat, http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/trial.watch/profile/db/facts/frans_van-anraat_- 286.html (last visited Mar.
8, 2009) (discussing the case against Dutch citizen Frans Van Anraat, who was
convicted of complicity in war crimes for supplying Saddam Hussein's regime with
chemical supplies used against the Kurds and Iran).
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controversial,3 it has not been applied to corporate actors.
This Note examines the development of the principle of
universal jurisdiction and how it can be used to apply to
corporations in order to hold them liable for complicity. Part I
explains the concept of universal jurisdiction, examines relevant
developments in international law, and examines the case
history of some of the states utilizing the principle. It also gives
a brief history of corporate complicity, both criminal and civil, in
the international arena. Part II analyzes the trends emerging
from the development of international law and offers a
framework for when and why a corporation might be held liable
under the theory of universal jurisdiction. This Note concludes
that although state practice and customary international law do
not clearly establish when a corporation will be held liable, the
development of international law indicates that universal
jurisdiction may be used to hold corporations liable for aiding
and abetting human-rights violations as states adopt statutes in
accordance with their obligations under the International
Criminal Court (ICC).4
I. BACKGROUND ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND
CORPORATE COMPLICITY
A. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Universal jurisdiction is the notion that a state may
prosecute individuals for certain crimes, regardless of where the
perpetrator or victim resides or where the crimes were
committed.' Historically, universal jurisdiction has been
exercised over crimes, such as piracy, that occur beyond state
borders and are difficult to prosecute under traditional notions
of jurisdiction.' The modern rationale supporting universal
jurisdiction is that some crimes are by their very nature so
3. Cf. Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking
Judicial Tyranny, Foreign Affairs (Jul. 2001), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general12001/O7kiss.htm. But cf. Kenneth
Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faresponse5577/kenneth-roththe-case-for-
universal-jurisdiction.html.
4. For a description of the ICC, see infra text surrounding footnote 35.
5. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 1, at 143. See also Mark L. Frankfurt,
German Prosecutor Asked to Investigate Rumsfeld, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.con2006/1 1/14/world/europe/14cnd.german.html.
6. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 1, at 143.
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heinous that every state has an interest in prosecuting them.7
The scope of universal jurisdiction is limited to crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture.8
States exercise universal jurisdiction differently. Many
states defer jurisdiction to the state where the crime occurred or
whose nationals are involved, if that state has the means and
desire to prosecute the crime, but will invoke the principle if it
appears that an individual might escape liability.' Some states
require an independent basis for personal jurisdiction, such as
the physical presence of the accused for criminal prosecutions or
minimum contacts for civil proceedings." Other states exercise
jurisdiction even if the perpetrator has no contacts with the
state.1' Universal jurisdiction has never been used to hold a
corporation criminally liable, and historically it is exercised in
criminal, not civil, proceedings. 2
1. History and Development of International Law
To understand the interplay of universal jurisdiction and
corporate aiding-and-abetting liability, it is helpful to have a
brief history of the development of international law after World
War II (WWII). Before WWII, individuals were not subject to
international law. 3 States were thought capable to deal with
their citizens as they sought fit, and had rights and obligations
7. Id.
8. Universal jurisdiction statutes have also included human and narcotics
trafficking, and terrorism. IBA REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 154 [hereinafter IBA TASK FORCE] (on file with author), available at
http://www.ibanet.org (search for "Extraterritorial Task Force Report"); see also Tom
Ongena & Ignance Van Daele, Universal Jurisdiction for International Core Crimes:
Recent Developments in Belgium, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 687, 687 (2002).
9. See Ongena & Van Daele, supra note 8, at 687.
10. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 1, at 144. Some states that require this
independent jurisdictional basis are Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and France. See, e.g., id. at 149.
11. This is often called "pure" universal jurisdiction. M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and
Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 137 (2001). See generally Christine
A.E. Bakker, Universal Jurisdiction of Spanish Courts Over Genocide in Tibet: Can
it Work?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 595 (2006).
12. Historically universal jurisdiction is exercised in criminal, not civil,
proceedings. See generally Donovan & Roberts, supra note 1 (discussing the
emergence of civil universal jurisdiction). See also infra note 230.
13. Anna Triponel, Business and Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends in the
United States and France, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 855, 857-58 (2008).
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only vis-A-vis other states. 14  As a result of the atrocities
committed during WWII, it became clear that states had an
interest in prosecuting actors and actions outside their
traditional jurisdictions. 5 The Nuremberg Tribunals were thus
created to determine the culpability of those thought responsible
for WWII crimes,' 6 establishing the first notion of universal
jurisdiction: that states can prosecute certain grave crimes,
regardless of where those crimes occur. 7 These atrocities were
codified in international instruments after WWII. For example,
the 1946 Genocide Convention confirmed genocide as a crime in
international law, 8 obligating the parties to "prevent and
punish" genocide, although only in the state where the genocide
occurred. 9  The Convention did not, however, provide for
universal jurisdiction or impose the duty to extradite or
prosecute (known as "aut dedere aut judicare").°
Universal jurisdiction was subsequently codified in the 1949
Geneva Conventions.2' The Geneva Conventions state that
parties have the right and the duty to prosecute or extradite
14. Id.; see also Evo Popoff, Inconsistency and Impunity in International
Human Rights Law: Can the International Criminal Court Solve the Problems
Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
363, 366 (2001) (discussing the problems the Allies encountered when trying to
make the Tribunals legal because international law had never recognized crimes
committed by a sovereign against its own subjects).
15. Gerrad J. Mekjian & Matthew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim's Voice:
Analysis of Victims' Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the
International Criminal Court, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2005).
16. See id. at 7-8. In addition, a tribunal was created to prosecute war crimes
in Japan. See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to
Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 113-17 (2002) for a
discussion of a case against a Japanese mining company. See also infra note 118.
17. Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 15, at 8-9 (noting that "[tihe Nuremberg
Principles ... imposed individual criminal liability for grave international crimes
and were later construed to require states to prosecute these crimes," and that
Nuremberg's precedential effect is evinced by subsequent treaties imposing the duty
to prosecute grave crimes regardless of territoriality).
18. LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
19. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. I, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 ("[G]enocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which [the Parties]
undertake to prevent and to punish.").
20. Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of
Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
399, 403 (2001).
21. See Laurie King-Irani, Universal Jurisdiction: Still Trying to Try Sharon,
Middle East Report, July 30, 2002, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073002.html.
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individuals suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide.22 Many states modeled their national legislation
after the Conventions,23 which apply only to individuals.24
The 1984 Torture Convention,25 which confers an explicit
duty to make torture an offense under national law,26 has been
described by influential scholars as the "high point" of the use of
universal jurisdiction.27  The Convention imposes on state
parties the duty to prosecute or extradite a suspected violator,
creating a form of universal jurisdiction between those states.28
Individual states had to take the initiative to prosecute the
crimes codified under the Genocide, Geneva, and Torture
22. Each of the four Conventions contains a common article obligating
prosecution or extradition. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 236; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386.
Collectively, these Conventions comprise the Geneva Conventions.
23. See, e.g., Ongena & Van Daele, supra note 8, at 689-90 (noting that
Belgium's legislature looks to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in addition to taking the
definition of genocide directly from Article 2 of the Genocide Convention).
24. Most states are signatories to the Conventions, so the provision mandating
obligatory extradition or prosecution of war crime suspects had potentially enormous
impact. In addition, the Geneva Conventions are considered to be customary
international law, thus binding even the few states that are not signatories. Cf.
I.C.R.C. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June
1977: Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions and Successions as at 31 December 1993,
10 (1993). Some have argued that the Genocide and the Geneva Conventions apply
to corporations. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About
Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 266 (2004) (asserting
that a corporation can aid or abet in genocide under Article 4 of the Genocide
Convention and that Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions binds all parties to an
armed conflict, including non-state actors).
25. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
26. Id. art. 4.
27. Conversation with Professor David Weissbrodt of the Univ. of Minn. Law
School, Oct. 14, 2008.
28. Torture Convention, supra note 25, arts. 5 & 7(1). These articles are often
cited as standing for the principle of universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., REYDAMS,
supra note 18, at 181 (discussing Senegalese proceedings against Chad's Habr6 and
indicating that articles 5 and 7 of the UN Torture Convention require Senegal to
repress torture). But see M. Cherif Bassioiuni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction
and Its Place in International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39, 55 (Stephen
Macedo ed., 2006) (describing article 7(1) as more of a duty to "extradite or
prosecute" than a notion of universal jurisdiction, and that the duty to prosecute in
reliance on universal jurisdiction arises only if the person is not extradited).
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Conventions because the relationship between the United States
and the USSR deteriorated as the Cold War intensified.29
International law remained relatively stagnant as the two
countries jostled for power, preventing many developments by
taking opposite stances on nearly every issue.3" When the Cold
War ended, the international community was able to resume the
prosecution of violators of these grave crimes.
The first tribunals to punish violations of international
human rights after Nuremberg were the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)." The ICTR was
created in response to genocide, and the ICTY was created in
response to the dissolution of a state and the resulting ethnic
violence.32 Both imposed individual, criminal liability on a
person who "aid[s] or abet[s] in the planning, preparation or
execution" of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes.33
The ICTY and the ICTR were followed by the creation of a
permanent criminal court to prosecute serious violations of
29. See generally Stephanie Carvin, Note, Caught in the Cold: International
Prisoners of War and Prisoners of War During the Cold War, 11 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 67 (2006) (discussing the Cold War and its effect on post-WWII
relations and law).
30. Id. For example, the creation of a permanent, international criminal court
with the jurisdiction to hear grave crimes was put on indefinite hold because of Cold
War tensions. Popoff, supra note 14, at 367 (noting that the Cold War and the
resulting "wars by proxy" made it impossible to create an international criminal
court).
31. Phillipe Ferlet & Patrice Sartre, The International Criminal Court in the
Light of American and French Positions 2,
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/The-InternationalCri156AB.doc.pdf
(last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
32. See Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials:
A Role for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 30-32
(2003).
33. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanities Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted May 25, 1993, as
amended by S.C. Res. 1660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1660 (Feb. 28, 2006), UN Doc. S/25705,
art. 7.1; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted Nov. 8,
1994, as amended by S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (Aug. 14, 2002), UN Doc.
S/RES/955, art. 61. The ICTR was groundbreaking for holding a radio station liable
for inciting genocide, see Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza ICTR 99-52-T, Dec. 3, 2003
Trial Chamber I, and for extending the notion of command responsibility to a
civilian corporate director. The defendant, a director of a tea factory, was found
guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination and rape) for his
role, see Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Appeals Chamber, Nov. 16,
2001.
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international law.34 The ICC, created by the 1994 Rome Statute,
has a unique type of mixed jurisdiction.35  Preference to
adjudicate is first given to a state with a traditional interest in
prosecuting a crime, such as the state where the crime occurred
or whose national perpetrated the crime.36 If such a state proves
unable or unwilling to prosecute the violator, then jurisdiction is
conferred onto the ICC;37 this is the notion of complementarity.3 8
The Rome Statute provides that it is a crime for an
individual to aid or abet a war crime, a crime against humanity,
or an act of genocide. 9 The Rome Statute's drafting history
indicates that many states wanted to include criminal liability
for corporations.4 ° However, there was tension between civil-
and common-law countries regarding the inclusion of such a
provision.4' Civil-law countries do not have mechanisms under
their national systems to prosecute legal entities, effectively
conferring automatic jurisdiction on the ICC in such
proceedings.42 Corporate liability was therefore excluded in the
interest of completing the Rome Statute in a timely fashion. 3
34. See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights
Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304, 313 (2008)
(noting that the purpose of the ICC is to ensure that "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community ... not go unpunished").
35. Cf. Broomhall, supra note 20, at 399-400.
36. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations
Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, entered into force, July 1, 2002,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 21, art. 17 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
37. Id.
38. See Cassel, supra note 34, at 316; see also Rome Statute, supra note 36,
pmbl.
39. Rome Statute, supra note 36, art. 25(3)(c).
40. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 at
49. art. 23 5 ("The Court shall ... have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the
exception of States, when the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such
legal persons or by their agencies or representatives.").
41. See Cassel, supra note 34, at 315. In many civil law countries, there is no
concept of corporate criminally liability. See id. at 316.
42. Id. at 316.
43. See id. at 316 (noting that the time frame for completing the Statute was a
mere five weeks); see also Andrew Clapman, The Question of Jurisdiction Under
International Criminal Law over Legal Persons, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 146 (Menno T. Kamminga & S.
Zia-Zarifi eds., Kluwer Law International 2000) (discussing the opposition to
including corporate liability). However, negotiations leading up to the drafting
period lasted much longer than five weeks; it is unlikely that more time during the
drafting problem would have resolved such a fundamental systemic difference. See
Cassel, supra note 34, at 315-16 (noting that fundamental policy differences among
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However, many of the 108 signatories' have enacted, or will
enact, domestic legislation to take advantage of the notion of
complementarity provided for in the ICC.45 This implementing
legislation opens the door for corporate aiding-and-abetting
liability at the national level, especially in countries that
already recognize corporate criminal liability.
2. Case History
There are criminal and civil notions of universal
jurisdiction. A few of the most influential and relevant cases
are discussed below.
(i). Criminal Universal-Jurisdiction Proceedings
The first example of criminal universal jurisdiction46 is
widely regarded to be the trial of Adolf Eichmann." Eichmann,
a high-ranking Nazi official who escaped the Nuremberg trials
by hiding in Argentina, was captured by Israeli agents and
brought to Israel to stand trial for war crimes.4" Israel based its
jurisdiction on a statute that gave courts jurisdiction over
the parties).
44. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome
+Statute.htm [hereinafter ICC Assembly of States], for a list of state parties as of
June 1, 2008.
45. An example of a state that enacted such legislation is Australia, discussed
infra text accompanying note 61. Other nations that have implemented provisions
establishing jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in
accordance with their ICC obligations and who also recognize criminal corporate
liability are Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Joanna
Kyriakakis, Note, Australian Prosecution of Corporations for International Crimes:
The Potential of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 809, 819
(2007).
46. "[Ulniversal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature
of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of
the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising ... jurisdiction." PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN
LAw & PUB. AFF., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2001).
47. IBA TASK FORCE, supra note 8. The Nuremberg Trials were created by a
charter and thus are not equivalent to a state asserting jurisdiction based on
domestic legislation. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, Aug.
8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546.
48. Id. He was ultimately found guilty and hanged. BBC, 1961: Nazi War
Crimes Trial Begins,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/11/newsid_247600012476225.st
m (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
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''crimes against the Jewish people" regardless of territoriality or
nationality.4 9
Since Eichmann, several states have utilized universal-
jurisdiction statutes. Belgium has been one of the most active
countries exercising universal jurisdiction. Noteworthy cases
tried under Belgium's universal-jurisdiction statute include the
4 of Butare the case against Ndombasi Yerodia, former
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) 1 and the case against Hiss6ne Habr6, former
President of Chad. 2 The Yerodia case ultimately caused the
Belgian legislature to amend its universal-jurisdiction law to
include a jurisdictional hook. 3
While Belgium narrowed its application of universal
jurisdiction in response to international pressure,54 other states
maintained or increased the scope of their universal-jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Spain has one of the broadest universal-
jurisdiction statutes and instigated another famous universal-
jurisdiction case-the trial of former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet 5
49. The law was called the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law
(1950). IBA TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 13.
50. The 4 of Butare involved four Rwandan civilians who were accused of
committing war crimes. Ongena & Van Daele, supra note 8, at 687. The defendants
were convicted or war crimes. Id. at 694. One defendant successfully removed his
case to the ICTR, but the other three were unsuccessful on appeal and their
convictions stood. Id. at 694.
51. In 1998 Congolese citizens filed an action in Belgian courts alleging that
Yerodia had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id. at 694-95.
52. Id. at 693. For a discussion of the Habr6 case, see generally Tanaz
Moghadam, Note, Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from Hybrid
Tribunals as Applied to the Case of Hiss~ne Habr4, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471
(2008).
53. As a result of the Yerodia litigation, the DRC filed a complaint against
Belgium with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2000. Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 6 (Feb. 14).
The ICJ ruled that Belgium had violated the principle of diplomatic immunity for
state officials. Id. at 33. Foreign pressure on Belgium to change its universal-
jurisdiction legislation increased, and Belgium eventually modified its law in 2003 to
require that the perpetrator to be of Belgian nationality or residence. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, Aug. 1, 2003,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/07/31/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed.
54. For example, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld threatened
to revoke Belgium's status as host to NATO headquarters if it did not modify its law.
Id. Ironically, Rumsfeld would be indicted by German courts under their universal
jurisdiction statute after he resigned. See Frankfurt, supra note 5.
55. Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute
Human-rights Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 495, 496-97 (2007).
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In 1996, Spanish nationals filed a complaint against
Pinochet under Spain's universal-jurisdiction statute. 6 While
the suit was pending, Pinochet left Chile to receive medical
attention in London, and the Spanish government successfully
got British authorities to arrest Pinochet. 7 Britain ultimately
concluded that it could extradite Pinochet to Spain because the
United Kingdom had ratified and incorporated the Torture
Convention into domestic law. 8 Although Spain was never able
to prosecute Pinochet because he was declared mentally unfit to
stand trial, 9 the case has been hailed as one of universal
jurisdiction's greatest achievements.6"
Spain and Belgium are among the states best known for
exercising universal jurisdiction. Their famous cases involve
individual prosecutions, generally against political actors during
times of war or dictatorships. However, as states enact
domestic ICC-implementing legislation, the likelihood that
corporations will be subject to universal-jurisdiction proceedings
is increasing. An example of such a state is Australia.6 1
Australia introduced genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes into its criminal legislation in 1995 as part of its
ratification of the Rome Statute.62 Its ICC-implementing statute
recognizes the principle of universal jurisdiction by establishing
that anyone in any location, irrespective of citizenship or
56. Id. (alleging "genocide, torture, and other atrocities"). A separate action
was also brought by Chilean nationals, but the case involving Spanish citizens
raised the issue of the exercise of universal jurisdiction without a traditional nexus
of jurisdiction. Id. at 134-35.
57. Id. at 501.
58. Id. at 502. Therefore, they were obligated to extradite or prosecute him
since he was accused of the crime of torture. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Moghadam, supra note 52, at 480 (noting it had the effect of
establishing the notion that heads of state do not enjoy blanket immunity).
61. Australia has also attempted to impose aggressive statutory obligations on
corporations operating overseas to abide by minimum standards of conduct. See
Corporate Code of Conduct Bill, 2000 (Austl.). The United States has attempted to
enact a similar bill, Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2001), but both have met stiff opposition and neither has passed. See Library
of Congress: THOMAS, H.R. 2783, http://thomas.loc.govfbss/107search.html (Search
"Corporate Code of Conduct") (noting that the last major action for the U.S. Bill was
referred to subcommittee in 2001); Parliament of Australia, Corporate Code of
Conduct Bill 2000 [2002],
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legis
lation%2Fbills%2Fs259_first%2F0000%22 (noting the status of the bill as "not
proceeding").
62. Kyriakakis, supra note 45, at 810.
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residence, can be tried for crimes against humanity, genocide, or
war crimes.63 The Australian criminal code also explicitly states
that for the purposes of its laws, "[a] [corporation] is no different
than an individual, and a corporation may be found guilty of any
offense, including one punishable by imprisonment."'
These laws make it possible for the Australian government
to hold corporations liable for human-rights violations. The
Australian government has already investigated the complicit
actions of a corporation in the DRC in an event known as the
"Kilwa Incident."65  Anvil, an Australian mining company,
allegedly aided and abetted the military suppression of a local
uprising.66  Anvil allegedly provided company vehicles and
drivers to transport troops, and distributed food and payment to
the soldiers who allegedly committed rape, murder, and
enforced disappearance.6 7 While the Australian government was
investigating the incident, a Military Court in the DRC brought
charges against three Anvil employees in their individual
capacities.6 8 The three employees were acquitted,69 and shortly
thereafter, Australian law-enforcement agencies closed the case
without filing any charges.7"
It is unlikely that the ICC will ever hear this case because
the DRC is a Party to the Rome Statute.7 Since the DRC
conducted a trial, the ICC would have to conclude that that the
63. Id. at 819.
64. Id. at 815 (citing Criminal Code Part 2.5, § 12.1 (Austl.)).
65. Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case Study on Responsibility for
Human Rights in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 127, 147
(2008). For a detailed account of the events that occurred at Kilwa, see id. at 131-33
and Kyriakakis, supra note 45, at 811-14.
66. The uprising seems to have related to the rebels' unhappiness with what
they perceived to be the government "pocketing money from the mines." McBeth,
supra note 65, at 132. The rebels went to the mine owned by Anvil (the Dikulushi
mine) to talk to the representatives, who refused to negotiate. Id. The rebels then
stole fuel, trucks, and batteries belonging to Anvil. Id.; see also Kyriakakis, supra
note 45, at 812.
67. See McBeth, supra note 65, at 133-34; Kyriakakis, supra note 45, at 812-
13.
68. McBeth, supra note 65, at 143. Charges were also brought against
members of the military. Id.
69. Id. at 144-45 ("The court further held that the Anvil employees had been
coerced into handing over the vehicles and providing other support, and therefore
were not liable for aiding and abetting any crimes that may have been perpetrated
with that support.").
70. Id. at 151 ("Soon after the verdict.., acquitting three Anvil employees ....
the Australian Federal Police concluded its investigation without laying any
charges.").
71. See ICC Assembly of States, supra note 44.
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trial was a sham or that it was not independent, impartial, or
sufficiently observant of due process.72 While there have been
several criticisms of the DRC proceeding,73 it seems unlikely
that the ICC is ready to question the validity of a Party's
proceeding, absent clear and compelling evidence of some
impropriety.74
(ii). Civil Universal-Jurisdiction Proceedings
The United States has one of oldest universal-jurisdiction
statutes in the 1789 Alien Tort Statute (ATCA). The ATCA
gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an
alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." 6 "The [ATCA] does not
require the [violation] to be committed on U.S. territory or by a
U.S. national, and the courts have not imposed any such
requirements."77  The court must, however, have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant before it can hear an ATCA
claim.78
The Supreme Court addressed the ATCA for the first time
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.7 9 In Sosa, the Supreme Court held
72. Rome Statute, supra note 36, arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3).
73. See generally McBeth, supra note 65, at 143-47, for different criticisms of
the proceedings.
74. Id. at 158 (noting that "[tihe political difficulties for a young institution
such as the ICC [to declare] a lack of confidence in the authorities of the [DRC] ... "
make it unlikely that the incident will come before the ICC).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). The Alien Tort Statute is also referred to as the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). The United States has signed, but not ratified, the
Rome Statute. ICC Assembly of States, supra note 44 (showing the list of parties to
the Rome Statute among which the United States is not listed as having ratified);
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 63 (2002) (referring to President Clinton's decision on Dec.
31, 2000 to sign the Rome Statute). See generally id. at 63-66 (discussing the
Clinton Administration's reservations with the Rome Statute).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The "law of nations" has been recognized by U.S. courts
to refer to any "well-established, universally recognized" or "specific, universal, and
obligatory" norm of international law. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 1, at 146
(citing Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2nd Cir. 1980), and In re Estate of
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
77. Donovan and Roberts, supra note 1, at 146.
78. Triponel, supra note 13, at 905. For a corporation, this means it must be
headquartered or doing business in the United States. Id.
79. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The first ATCA case was the
1980 case of Filartiga v. Peha-Irala, heard in the Second Circuit. Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 878 (describing the ATCA as a "rarely-invoked provision"). The plaintiffs,
Paraguayan nationals, accused the defendant of torturing their son to death. Id.
Filartiga's lasting importance was that the court recognized that it had the
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that the ATCA granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases
on a limited number of international-law claims as they existed
in 1789.80 The claims include acts of piracy, the "infringement of
rights of ambassadors," and slave trade.81 The Court concluded
that the "door [was] ajar" to other claims similar to those
established in 1789, but that courts must exercise caution. 2
Sosa recognized torture as being a violation of customary
international norms and as falling under the ATCA.83 Although
Sosa involved individual, not corporate, defendants, the Court
mentioned corporations, addressing the possibility that the
ATCA might apply to corporate defendants.84
B. CORPORATE COMPLICITY
Criminal universal jurisdiction has thus far only been
applied to individual actors, sometimes in their corporate
capacity and sometimes for head-of-state activity. The United
States has historically been one of the only states willing to hold
corporations civilly liable for their complicit actions abroad.85
Civil cases might help predict under what circumstances a
corporation could risk criminal liability, especially as the
likelihood of criminal-complicity liability increases as states
begin enacting domestic legislation in compliance with the ICC.
The first notion of corporate complicity appeared during the
Nuremberg Trials. Although the Nuremberg Tribunals only had
the jurisdiction to try individuals,86 the Tribunals' findings were
jurisdiction to hear the claim, and that the plaintiffs had a cause of action under the
ATCA. See, e.g., Kristen Hutchens, Development, International Law in the
American Courts-Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.: The Decision Heard
'Round the Corporate World, 9 GERMAN L.J. 639, 639 (2008) (noting the holding of
Filartiga and calling it a "landmark case"). Sosa involved a Mexican defendant
accused of the wrongful torture and death of a DEA agent. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697
(2004). Alvarez was abducted from Mexico to stand trial in the United States. Id. at
698.
80. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
81. Id. at 720.
82. Id. at 729.
83. Id. at 732-33. The ATCA and some of its influential cases are discussed
more thoroughly below. See infra Part B.
84. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
85. It should be noted, however, that to date, no ATCA action against a
corporation has proceeded to judgment on the merits. Jonathan Clough, Punishing
the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 899, 902 (2008).
86. Ramasastry, supra note 16, at 106.
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largely based on the corporations' liability.87 One prominent
case was the Zyklon B Case, where the defendant, the president
of a gas-distribution company, was found liable for supplying
poisonous gas to the Nazi gas chambers.8 The defendant
advised the Nazi government that the gas in question could be
used against people.89 The company thus knew of the intended
purpose for the gas and continued to supply it to the
government. °
Another notable case was the Krupp case.9 In Krupp,
twelve defendants were accused of war crimes and crimes
against humanity for utilizing forced labor in various Krupp
factories in Germany.92 The court held the individuals liable but
offered lengthy discussions of the Krupp entity as the prime
actor and perpetrator of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.9 3
More recently, the ATCA has been increasingly used to
implicate and charge corporations with aiding and abetting
violations of the human rights that fall under universal
jurisdiction.94 Since Sosa, two of the most influential cases in
the realm of corporate complicity are Doe v. Unocal95 and
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank.96
87. See Cassel, supra note 34, at 315 (noting that the Tribunal was able to
declare organizations criminal, but only at the trial of an individual); see also
Ramasastry, supra note 16, at 106 (noting that much of the findings in the Farben
case were based on the corporation's actions).
88. The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, 1 Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 93, 93 (Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, 1946) (United Nations War
Crimes Commission ed., London, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947) available at
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/zyklonb.htm [hereinafter The Zyklon B Case].
89. Id. at 95.
90. Id. The gas was intended for "the extermination of lice." Id. at 94.
91. United States v. Krupp, et al., The Krupp Trial, 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 69 (1949). See Ramasastry, supra note 16, at 106-08 n.50 for a
discussion of two other cases, LG. Farben and Flick, implicating corporate
defendants where the tribunals spoke of corporate liability. United States v.
Krauch, et al., The I.G. Farben Case, 10 LAw REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 1 (1952); United States v. Flick, Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others,
9 LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1949).
92. The Krupp Trial, supra note 91.
93. Id. at 140, 168-69 ("We conclude that... illegal acts.., were committed
by, and on behalf of, the Krupp firm ... ").
94. The Second and Ninth Circuits are the most active in holding corporations
accountable as complicit actors for their actions abroad. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2002).
95. Id.
96. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). There
are many other important cases. E.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir.
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Doe v. Unocal held for the first time that the ATCA allows
an action to lie against a private corporation. 7 The Unocal
plaintiffs were citizens of Burma who had been raped, tortured,
and forced to provide labor for Unocal's pipeline by the
military. 8 The plaintiffs alleged that Unocal knew, or should
have known, that the military, in providing security measures
for the pipeline, would forcibly relocate citizens without
compensation and compel labor on the pipeline.9 After the
court found that Unocal could be held liable for aiding and
abetting, the parties settled, and the court vacated its holding as
part of the settlement agreement."°° However, the notion that
U.S. courts were willing to hold corporations liable for
complicity reverberated throughout the international corporate
community, as many corporations were unsure of when they
might face civil liability resulting from their foreign activities.'
The Khulumani plaintiffs were South African citizens who
implicated a large number of multinational corporations in their
ATCA claim for aiding and abetting apartheid. 2 The sheer
number of defendants, and the substantial amount of
compensation sought by the victims, made the case highly
visible."3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
2008); Bowoto v. Chevron, No. C 99-02506 SI, 2008 WL 4822251 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5,
2008); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2004).
97. Hutchens, supra note 79, at 640.
98. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 936. See also Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects
of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances
Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 211 (2008) (describing the
circumstances of the case).
99. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 940 ('Unocal was made aware-by its own consultants
and employees, its partners in the Project, and human-rights organizations--of
allegations that the [government] was actually committing such violations in
connection with the Project."). Unocal ostensibly hired the military to maintain
security along the pipeline. Id. at 937-38.
100. See John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708, 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating
its decision in Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2002)).
101. Khulumani had the potential to quiet these fears. Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). Instead, it "raised the eyebrows of
corporations worldwide." Hutchens, supra note 79, at 658.
102. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258 (noting that there were approximately fifty
corporate defendants whom the plaintiffs accused of "actively and willingly
collaborat[ing] with the government of South Africa in maintaining.., apartheid.").
The defendants include Ford Motor Company, Shell Oil Company, ExxonMobil
Corporation, General Electric Company, Xerox Corporation, The Coca-Cola
Company, and Hewlett-Packard Company. Hutchens, supra note 79, at 644.
103. Hutchens, supra note 79, at 644 (noting that "the size of the relief sought
[was] unprecedented," amounting to some $400 billion dollars and that the
defendants were the "who's who of the world's largest banks and manufacturers").
2009] UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION & CORPORATIONS
that there is aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATCA.' °
However, the judges in the majority disagreed on the proper
mens rea standard-"purpose" or "knowledge"-that the
assistance would further a human-rights violation."5
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari for
Khulumani."'6 Four of the justices recused themselves, so the
Court, for lack of a quorum, affirmed the judgment from the
court below as if it had been an equally split court."°7 In effect,
the Court did not rule on the merits"°8 and the standard for
corporate complicit liability under the ATCA remains
undetermined. 9
C. SOFT-LAW INSTRUMENTS ADDRESSING CORPORATE HUMAN-
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
The international community has acknowledged corporate
liability, due in part to the expansion of liability under
mechanisms such as the ATCA and the convergence of ICC
implementing domestic legislation and existing domestic
legislation.' A number of soft-law instruments attempt to
define corporate obligations in regard to human rights. For
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
established in 1948, provides that "every organ of society" has
obligations to observe human rights."' The UDHR has been
104. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.
105. Id. at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (arguing that the mens rea standard
should be "purpose" for a crime of assisting in a human-rights violation); id. at 288-
89 (Hall, J., concurring) (finding "knowing practical assistance" sufficient to hold a
corporation liable for aiding and abetting). Cf. id. at 292, 321-26, 332-33 (Korman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that a "purpose" test was
required, but that it could apply only to individuals since corporations could not be
held liable for aiding and abetting under international law).
106. Under the name American Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
107. Am. Isuzu Motors, 128 S. Ct. at 2424 ("[T]he judgment is affirmed under 28
U.S.C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances the Court shall enter
its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for
review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided Court.").
108. This type of affirmance is entitled to no precedential weight, and the
judgment of the case below is considered to be the final disposition of the case.
ROBERT L. STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1149 (8th ed. 2002).
109. There are several cases coming through the courts that may eventually
help clarify these uncertainties, including those listed, supra note 96.
110. This could lead to possible corporate criminal liability for universal-
jurisdiction crimes, as demonstrated by Australia, discussed supra Part A.
111. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl. U.N.
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). See David Weissbrodt, Keynote Address: International
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recognized to apply to businesses because businesses are
thought to be included as part of "every organ of society."" 2 In
1976, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) established the Guidelines for
Multinational Corporations, calling for the promotion of
responsible business conduct."3  The UN Global Compact,
created in 1998, asked businesses to adopt a set of core
principles addressing human-rights obligations."4
In 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights released the Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN
Norms). These aim to distill corporations' human-rights
responsibilities. 5 In June 2008, the UN Human Rights Council
released the report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General John Ruggie (Ruggie Report), containing his
views and recommendations on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations, and the most current analysis of the
state of international and domestic law with respect to the
subject."6  The Ruggie Report proposed a framework for
approaching corporate liability in respect to human rights, and
Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Business, 26 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 373, 377 (2008) [hereinafter Weissbrodt, Standard-Setting].
112. Weissbrodt, Standard-Setting, supra note 111, at 377. Many of the
UDHR's provisions are now universally recognized as customary international law.
See generally Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 129, 133-34 (1977). Some have asserted that the UDHR in toto constitutes
customary international law. E.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HuMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNITY 274, 325-27 (1980).
113. Weissbrodt, Standard-Setting, supra note 111, at 378.
114. The Global Compact, The Ten Principles, Princ. 2,
http://www.unglobal.compact.org/content/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples.htm. The
Global Compact states that corporations should ensure "they are not complicit in
human rights abuses." Id.
115. The relevant section states, "[T]ransnational corporations and other
business enterprises have the obligation to promote ... and protect human rights
recognized in international as well as national law .. " U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prot. & Promotion of Human Rights, Working Group,
Norms on the Rights and Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 1, U.N. Doc.
E/EN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2,(Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter UN Norms].
116. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for
Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, 8, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (prepared by John
Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Report].
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suggested that states and corporations have affirmative duties
to ensure that corporations are complying with human-rights
norms. Furthermore, many corporations have developed
voluntary methods of self-regulation and company policies to
ensure compliance with human-rights obligations. These
methods are discussed more thoroughly in Part II(A)(4)(ii).
II. TRENDS FAVOR CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The uncertainty surrounding corporate-complicity liability
in international law is unlikely to be resolved soon.
Nevertheless, trends in international law demonstrate an ever-
increasing scope of liability that has expanded to include
corporations, and that domestic legislation will increasingly use
concepts of universal jurisdiction to hold corporations liable for
aiding and abetting human-rights violations as states enact
ICC-implementing legislation. This Note analyzes these trends,
and then discusses when and why corporations should be held
liable under universal jurisdiction.
A. THE TRENDS DEMONSTRATE A CONTINUALLY EXPANDING
SCOPE OF LIABILITY
The development of international law since WWII evinces
an expanding view toward holding parties responsible for
egregious conduct. This is demonstrated by the contributions of
different tribunals and instruments during the past seventy
years that have increased the scope of liability for crimes and for
different types of actors. The next logical step in this continuing
evolution of international law will be states holding corporations
liable for violating human rights under existing domestic
universal-jurisdiction legislation, or by enforcing ICC
obligations via domestic legislation.
1. Post WWII: Individual Liability Relating to Corporate Activity
The Nuremberg Tribunals expanded the scope of
international criminal law by prosecuting individual actors.'17
117. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 271-72 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that not only did Nuremberg extend
individual liability, but also liability to accomplices of any crime triable by the
Tribunal).
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Nuremberg also advanced the notion of universal jurisdiction:
states held foreign nationals liable for activities committed
outside of their jurisdictions for the first time. Cases such as
Zyklon B and Krupp illustrate that courts believed that
corporations were capable of committing the heinous crimes
tried at Nuremberg."8 It can be inferred from the language of
the decisions that if the Tribunals would have had jurisdiction
over corporate entities, they would have been willing to hold
them liable for committing these acts."9 The court in each case
discussed the wrongdoings committed by each corporation in
great detail, and found the individuals guilty only after
establishing that the actions of the corporation violated human
rights, whether by selling poisonous gas to the government with
the knowledge it would be used against humans,2 ' or by using
prisoners as forced labor for the company's profit. 2'
2. Cold War: Universal Jurisdiction Used as a Gap-filler
The Cold War interrupted the development of additional
opportunities for states to try violators of international human-
rights norms in specific tribunals such as those used at
Nuremberg. Universal jurisdiction became a "gap filler"; that is,
it was used to catch and punish those who would otherwise slip
through the cracks of the other jurisprudential mechanisms of
international law. Eichmann and Pinochet are two instances
where domestic criminal actions were brought against human-
rights violators who might otherwise have avoided
prosecution.'22
The English court justified the Pinochet decision by
118. There was also a tribunal held to try members of the Japanese coalition
that examined issues of corporate liability. See, e.g., Ramasastry supra note 16, at
113-17 (discussing the case against the Nippon Mining Company for utilizing forced
labor during WWII). These cases, which were similar to Nuremberg in their
treatment of corporate liability, are not discussed here. See also note 16.
119. For example, the Tribunal stated, "When private individuals, including
juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy.., such action ... is in
violation of international law." Clapman, supra note 43, at 167 (quoting 8 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1153) (emphasis in
original). A corporation is an example of a juristic person. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004); see also Ramasastry, supra note 16, at 106-08
(discussing the possibility of the Tribunals holding the corporations liable).
120. The Zyklon B Case, supra text accompanying note 88. See also Cassel,
supra note 34, at 312.
121. The Krupp Trial, supra text accompanying note 91.
122. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 47 and 55.
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invoking the Torture Convention, and its willingness to do so
reflected the emerging recognition and endorsement of the
affirmative obligations to prosecute or extradite those
responsible for committing torture, crimes against humanity,
genocide, or war crimes under the notion of universal
jurisdiction-each of those crimes being codified in the Geneva
Conventions and the Torture Convention.23  The court's
invocation of the Torture Convention also demonstrated the
growing trend of holding individuals accountable for human-
rights violations despite the lack of an international forum in
which to do so.
3. Post-Cold War: Aiding-and-Abetting Liability
The ICTY and the ICTR were the first instances since
WWII in which international tribunals were utilized to
prosecute human-rights violations. Although the ICTY did not
have jurisdiction over corporations,'2 4 it established an aiding-
and-abetting standard'25 that U.S. courts have applied to
corporations in ATCA proceedings.'26 In addition, the standard
provides guidance to domestic criminal courts, such as
Australia's, that allow for criminal prosecution of corporations.'2 7
The ICTY standard for aiding and abetting requires an
actus reus element and a mens rea element.'28 The actus reus
123. See Triponel, supra note 13, for a discussion of how, during the Cold War,
these obligations were largely ignored and many serious crimes went unpunished;
see also Popoff, supra note 14, at 268 ("From 1948 to 1994, mass killings in Biafra,
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Somalia went unpunished despite the existence of the
[Genocide] Convention.").
124. Barrett & Little, supra note 32, at 82.
125. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 274 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that the inclusion of aiding-and-abetting liability
in the ICTY statute was important because the ICTY was intended to codify existing
customary international law).
126. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (using the
aiding-and-abetting standard adopted by the ICTY to ascertain international aiding-
and-abetting liability for the ATCA).
127. U.N. Human Rights Council, Clarifying the Concepts of "Sphere of
Influence" and "Complicity," Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises, 1 34, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (prepared by John
Ruggie) [hereinafter Complicity Report].
128. Angela A. Barkin, Corporate America-Making a Killing: An Analysis of
Why It is Appropriate to Hold American Corporations Who Fund Terrorist
Organizations Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism, 40 CAL. W.L. REV. 169, 182
(2003).
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element is satisfied if there is "practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime." '29 The mens rea element is
met if the defendant had actual or constructive "knowledge that
his actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of a
crime.""13 The accused does not have to share the intent of the
perpetrator, or even know the crime the perpetrator intends to
or does commit. 3' The defendant merely needs to know or have
reason to know that a crime will probably be committed and if
one is, he could be held liable for aiding and abetting.'32
The ICTR uses a similar standard to the ICTY for aiding-
and-abetting liability."' In addition, the ICTR extended
command responsibility to a corporate actor in Prosecutor v.
Musema.'34  Although the ICTR, like the ICTY, only had
jurisdiction over natural persons, this case further demonstrates
how the law is evolving to increase liability for corporate actors.
The ATCA expanded aiding-and-abetting liability further
than the ICTY and the ICTR to apply to corporations in civil
proceedings. In a thirty-year period, the ATCA went from two
centuries of disuse to holding corporations liable for human-
rights violations.'35  U.S. courts have determined that
129. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 235 (Dec. 10,
1998).
130. Id. 245.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence,
126, 180-81 (Jan. 27, 2000) (describing the actus reus of aiding and abetting as "all
acts of assistance in the form of either physical or moral support" that "substantially
contribute to the commission of the crime" and the mens rea as existing if "at the
moment he acted, the accomplice knew of the assistance he was providing in the
commission of the principal offence."); Barkin, supra note 128, at 183 ("[T]he
standards set forth... by the ICTY and the ICTR are similar in nature ... ").
134. Musema, ICTR96-13-T, 895. The defendant, Musema, was found to have
superior control over his employees at a tea plantation, and was therefore in a
position to influence them to effectuate war crimes. Id. 894. The ICTR was only
able to prosecute Musema in his individual capacity because of inconsistencies in
witness reports. Id. 845.
135. The ATCA first permitted non-U.S. citizens to sue other foreign nationals
for violations of international law, Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), then allowed an action against a non-state actor, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232, 239, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that slave trade violates the law of nations
when undertaken by private individuals as well as state actors, as well as finding
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity to be actionable under the
ATCA), and ultimately was applied to a corporate actor, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
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corporations can be liable for the crimes recognized under
universal jurisdiction that are considered customary
international law, such as torture, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. ' The Supreme Court left the "door
ajar" to the inclusion of other crimes, although it warned courts
to use caution. 37
Although the Supreme Court did not clarify the conflicting
mens rea standards for corporate liability in Khulumani, the
Second Circuit's willingness to hold the defendant liable in a
proceeding implicating a large number of corporations indicates
the growing scope of ATCA liability. As the international
community recognizes the influence, resources, and power of
multinational corporations, the ATCA will continue to be an
important option for holding corporations liable for their
actions.38
4. New Millennium, New Responsibilities: The ICC and
Corporate Norms
(i). The ICC
The ICC was a significant accomplishment in international
law, since it was doubtful that countries with such divergent
interests would reach a consensus and agree on a workable
statute.'3 9 The variance between common-law and civil-law
systems would have had international and domestic
consequences for the Statute's parties had corporate aiding-and-
abetting liability been included in the Rome Statute.1 41 In
addition to the absence of corporate criminal responsibility in
civil-law countries and the resulting complementarity
implications, the civil- and common-law countries disagreed
over whether aiding-and-abetting liability should require a
136. See, e.g., Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239-40.
137. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728-29 (2005).
138. See, e.g., Complicity Report, supra note 127, 29 (noting that there have
been forty ATCA claims brought against companies since 1993, most alleging
corporate complicity).
139. Christopher "Kip" Hale, Does the Evolution of International Criminal Law
End With the ICC? The "Roaming" ICC: A Model International Criminal Court for a
State-Centric World of International Law, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 429, 430
(2007) ("[T]he 1998 Rome Statute ... must be viewed as a tireless, monumental
success.").
140. See supra Part I(A)(1), and the discussion surrounding notes 40-45.
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"knowledge" standard or an "intent" standard. 4' A compromise
was reached: a "purpose" test was adopted for the crime of
assisting a human-rights violation.'42
The ICC has yet to construe this article and thus its
meaning is undetermined.'43 However, under the notion of
complementarity, signatory states benefit by enacting the
language of the ICC into their domestic legislation. States could
choose either to adopt the ICC's purpose test of or the actual or
constructive knowledge standard of the ICTY (as the United
States has in ATCA cases)." Signatories differ in how they
have incorporated the language of the ICC, with some borrowing
verbatim from the Rome Statute, and others creating broader or
more restrictive definitions of its content.4 Australia included
parts of the Rome Statute in its implementing legislation,'46 and
by investigating Anvil's actions in the DRC, it demonstrated its
potential willingness to hold corporations liable under ICC
obligations. The question remains, however: why have the
states, whose domestic legislation permits corporations to be
held criminally liable, not exercised the option to do so?
Although Anvil could have been liable for war crimes under
Australia's criminal code,"' the Australian government might
have elected not to pursue this claim for several reasons. First,
Australia has not yet applied the new legislation, and thus it is
not entirely clear that Australia intended the legislation to
apply to corporations.'48 Second, the facts of the Anvil case are
141. Cassel, supra note 34, at 310-11.
142. Rome Statute, supra note 36, at art. 25(3)(c).
143. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 275 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring); see also Cassel, supra note 34, at 311-15 (discussing
how the "knowledge" and "purpose" tests could be construed). But see K. Ambos,
General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 CRIM. L.F. 1, 12-13
(1999) (denying that the purpose test requires anything less than purpose).
144. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948-50 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. States can exceed the terms of the ICC by including crimes not listed in the
ICC as those that are illegal. Julio Bacio Terracino, National Implementation of ICC
Crimes: Impact on National Jurisdictions and the ICC, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 421,
424 (2007).
146. Australia included articles 6, 7, and 8 of the ICC. International Criminal
Court Act 2002, No. 41 (Austl.); ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002, No. 42
(Austl.).
147. McBeth, supra note 65, at 149.
148. See Kyriakakais, supra note 45, at 815-16 (noting that it could be argued
that the Australian Parliament did not mean the legislation enacted pursuant to its
ICC obligations to apply to corporations since it never explicitly addressed the
extension of criminal responsibility to corporations during the implementation
process, but noting that they could have amended the Criminal Code at any time to
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not the most favorable for trying to establish precedent-setting
corporate liability under the new criminal code. Anvil claims
that it only provided the assistance it did because it was ordered
to by the DRC government.'49 Therefore, it is not as clear a case
as Unocal, where the corporation either hired or requested the
services of the military,5 ° and as a result of this hiring, crimes
were committed. Third, Australia probably contemplated the
political ramifications of questioning the judgment of the DRC
and may have decided those considerations trumped opening a
case.15' Finally, Australia may not have uncovered tangible
facts establishing that Anvil was responsible for aiding and
abetting the commission of a war crime.'52
More broadly, criminal universal jurisdiction in the human-
rights context is a nascent concept that has only been applied to
foreign heads of state at this stage in its development. Applying
the rationale and standards of individual aiding-and-abetting
liability to corporate aiding-and-abetting liability is a logical
step in the evolution of universal jurisdiction and international
law, however, and the actions taken by the Australian
government indicate the direction in which the law is headed. It
seems likely that domestic legislation recognizing universal
jurisdiction, either in the form of ICC-implementing legislation
or otherwise, will be used to hold corporations liable under ICC-
implementing legislation.
(ii). Corporate Law Development Indicates Growing Recognition of
Human-Rights Obligations
As countries like Australia enact domestic legislation in
accordance with their ICC obligations and the United States
continues to allow corporations to be prosecuted under the
ATCA, international lawmakers and corporations alike have
recognized the need for clear standards of corporate obligations
exempt corporations from liability under the new legislation).
149. McBeth, supra note 65, at 134-35.
150. However, Anvil reportedly indicated immediately after the violence that
they were in "consultation with the Government of the DRC to provide additional
security for the mine" so that if the incidents continued "the company would be able
to continue its operations," indicating cooperation between Anvil and the
government. Kyriakakis, supra note 45, at 813.
151. McBeth, supra note 65, at 152 ("[T]hat decision constitutes a triumph of
political considerations over legal ones .... ").
152. See id. at 151 (noting that there has been no public report on the outcome of
Australia's investigation).
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and responsibility to protect human rights.'53  Rapid
globalization, especially since the 1990s, has resulted in a
"governance gap" between the operational reality of
transnational corporations and the ability of states to hold
corporations liable for their actions.'54 Human-rights violations
are most likely to occur in developing countries that are in need
of investment and that are eager to ensure that corporations do
not look elsewhere to invest.'55 These nations are unlikely to
have the resources to enforce national laws and might feel
constrained from doing so in order to ensure continued
investment.'5 6 The governments of such nations might be more
likely to engage in the types of practices that could expose a
corporation to liability, as evinced by the conduct of Myanmar's
government in Unocal. A number of different soft law
mechanisms have attempted to address corporate responsibility
in regard to human rights, but none have been particularly
successful. Nonetheless, they indicate that corporations realize
that corporate liability under national legislation is a business
risk that needs to be assessed when considering a business
venture."7
a. Soft-Law Mechanisms
The soft-law instruments examined here are the UDHR,
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, the
Global Compact, and the UN Norms.'58 The development of
these soft-law instruments demonstrates the recognition of
153. Ruggie Report, supra note 116, 8 ("Every stakeholder group, despite their
other differences, has expressed the urgent need for a common conceptual and policy
framework ... ").
154. Id. 13 ("[The] legal framework regulating transnational corporations
operates much as it did long before the recent wave of globalization.").
155. Id. 16.
156. Id. 14.
157. See, e.g., Cynthia Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging
Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 83 (2005)
(arguing that the modest success rate of plaintiffs surviving motions to dismiss in
ATCA cases should not be seen as an indication that there is not a significant-
enough risk of litigation for boards of directors to pay attention).
158. This list is by no means exhaustive. The Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 38, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/4/35 [hereinafter Business and Human Rights
Report]. Other significant instruments include the International Labour
Organization (ILO), one of the most cited treaties in corporate human-rights
policies. Id. 47. The ILO states that all parties should respect the UDHR. Id.
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corporate liability that has occurred in the past twenty years.
While these instruments are not binding, they can become a
factor during litigation.
For example, the UDHR did not specifically mention
corporations, but it has been interpreted broadly to include
them.'59 Almost all of its provisions have become customary
international law, 60 and companies frequently invoke the
UDHR when forming their own policies and maintain that they
comply with the UDHR.16' This indicates that some corporations
see themselves as having an obligation to uphold human rights,
which may eventually emerge as a customary corporate
practice.
In addition, corporations that expressly state that they will
respect human rights may have a difficult time defending
themselves credibly in court, even if they voluntarily committed
to respect human rights. 162 For example, Unocal's human-rights
policy stated that "Unocal supports the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights";'63 this policy "came back to haunt it" during the
ATCA litigation.'" Unocal subsequently removed its human-
rights policy from its public Website after the litigation,
arguably to avoid further impeachment.'6 5 Moreover, U.S.
courts have turned to the UDHR when determining whether an
alleged crime qualifies as a violation of the law of the nations in
ATCA claims.16
The OECD Guidelines and the Global Compact, although
not considered customary international law like the UDHR,
specifically address corporate responsibility in regard to human-
rights violations.'67  The Global Compact, in addition to
159. See discussion supra Part I(C).
160. Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 158, 38. See also text of
and text surrounding note 112.
161. Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 158, 37.
162. Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies
for International Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 103, 112
(2004).
163. Unocal Corp., Human Rights and Unocal: A Discussion Paper, portion
reprinted in Mark D. Kielsgard, Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality, 36
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 185, 189 (2005).
164. Engle, supra note 162, at 112 n.66.
165. Kielsgard, supra note 162, at 188-89 nn.24-28 (2005).
166. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
forced labor to violate the law of the nations based on the UDHR), reh'g granted en
banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
167. Triponel, supra note 13, at 895 ("The revision of the OECD Guidelines in
2000 demonstrates an evolution towards the view that corporations should respect
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demonstrating how the international community views the
responsibilities of transnational corporations and the influence
transnational corporations have on the development of
international law, 6' could have far-reaching implications if
courts begin to look to it during proceedings as they have the
UDHR. About 3,700 companies have joined the Global
Compact.'69
Finally, the UN Norms have been praised for being a
"landmark step in holding businesses accountable for their
human rights abuses. .... , The UN Norms are phrased in
mandatory terms 7' and apply not only to transnational
corporations, but also to "other business enterprises,"'' as well
as their subcontractors and suppliers. The UN Norms thus go
many steps beyond previous guidelines, further evincing
expanding notions of corporate liability.'73
Like all of the instruments discussed above, the UN Norms
are presented in the form of recommendations and guidelines
that create no legally binding obligations. 74  Although the UN
Norms may help establish customary law, provide guidance to
human rights.").
168. Members of the business community were instrumental in developing these
principles, and many have argued that the Global Compact reflects the increased
influence of corporations in international lawmaking. Weissbrodt, Standard-
Setting, supra note 111, at 379. Likewise, corporations also lobbied successfully
during the drafting of the Rome Statute for the omission of "legal entities" from the
Statute. Conversation with Professor Weissbrodt, supra note 27.
169. Weissbrodt, Standard-Setting, supra note 111, at 381 (but noting that
another 67,000 transnational corporations have yet to join).
170. Kielsgard, supra note 163, at 199 (quoting David Weissbrodt & Muria
Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 902
(2003)).
171. Weissbrodt, Standard-Setting, supra note 111, at 389 ("The Sub-
Commission Norms apply to all businesses to the extent of their activities and
influence, and since no opt-in is required, no one may opt out.").
172. UN Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of
Human Rights, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Rights and
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, T 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003), http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2003/08ecosonorms.pdf. Other
business enterprises are defined as "any business entity, regardless of the
international or domestic nature of its activities, including a transnational
corporation . . . or other legal form used to establish a business entity .. " Id. -21.
173. For example, the issue of subcontractors and suppliers was only mentioned
in the OECD guidelines. Triponel, supra note 13, at 896.
174. That is, they are soft law instruments. Business and Human Rights
Report, supra note 158, 1 45; Triponel, supra note 13, at 897.
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courts trying to determine the extent of corporate norms, or
serve as the basis for later treaties, they do not have the same
effect that binding obligations have.'75 A binding consensus of
corporate obligations has proven to be difficult, but the Ruggie
Report provided a framework in an effort to facilitate that goal.
Until universal mandatory corporate norms and enforcement
mechanisms are established, however, national-court
proceedings will continue to be the most effective and feasible
method to hold corporations liable.
b. Corporate Self-Regulation
In addition to agreeing to soft-law regulations and
guidelines, many corporations have acknowledged the
importance of complying with international human-rights
norms by enacting company policies that address their
obligations.'7 6  The corporate social responsibility (CSR)
movement, which began in the 1970's,' caused many
corporations to impose voluntary standards on themselves and
to self-regulate.'78 Corporations did so due to the realization
that profits may result from complying with international
human-rights norms,'79 and in recognition that the costs of
noncompliance are increasing. Reputational costs to companies
accused of human-rights violations can be quite high,8 ° leading
investors in some instances to forego investment, or even to
divest their current holdings.' Some states have imposed a
fiduciary duty on corporations to ensure they engage in due
diligence to assure they are not violating human-rights
standards.'82 The Ruggie Report calls for due diligence on the
part of corporations to ensure the same.1
8 3
These internal human-rights policies-and the mechanisms
175. Triponel, supra note 13, at 897.
176. Id. at 887.
177. Id. at 875.
178. Id. at 887. American corporations were some of the first to do so, perhaps
as a result of ATCA litigation. Id.
179. Id. at 886.
180. See, e.g., JOHN DOORLEY & HELIo FRED GARCIA, REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
354-55 (discussing the fiscal and reputational damages Nike suffered because of
reports of child-labor practices, poor working conditions, and physical and sexual
assaults at its factories in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Pakistan, resulting in consumer
protests and government legislation banning products made with child labor).
181. Ruggie Report, supra note 116, T 75.
182. The United Kingdom is an example. Id. T 30.
183. Id. T 25.
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to ensure they are followed-might become more important as
some states, such as Australia, have begun to examine
''corporate culture" when determining corporate criminal
accountability. Australia examines company policies, rules, and
practices to determine liability as opposed to focusing on the
individual activity of individuals or employees. 8 ' CSR, like the
UDHR, can thus affect a corporation in unforeseen ways and
can create a standard to which corporations may be held.
As states like Australia enact national legislation
incorporating the human-rights obligations established in the
ICC, incentives for corporations to comply with these obligations
will only increase as potential fora for litigation increase.
States, in turn, have not only an interest but an affirmative
duty to ensure that corporations comply with human-rights
standards,185 and likely will enact legislation enabling them to
do so. 86 Finally, as states use domestic legislation conferring
jurisdiction over corporations, other states might enact similar
legislation to assure that their interests are being represented
as opposed to allowing other states to create and enforce
standards of corporate liability.
B. FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER DOMESTIC
STATUTES
That there is a trend toward using universal jurisdiction to
impose criminal-complicity liability on corporations is not itself
a reason for such use, unless the trend reflects the belief by
states that corporate criminal-complicity liability is required by
customary international law. In that case, the trend could be an
emerging norm of customary international law. There is no
evidence of this belief, however. The existence of the trend may
nevertheless lead to additional states imposing criminal
184. Id. $ 31 (citing "Corporate Culture as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of
Corporations," prepared for author by the law firm Allens Arthur Robinson,
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-
Corporate-Culture.paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf.) This, in turn, could affect when
corporate liability will be triggered. See discussion surrounding note 200, infra, Part
II(B)(1).
185. Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 158, 10 ("[l]nternational
law firmly establishes that States have a duty to protect against nonstate human
rights abuses within their jurisdiction, and that this duty extends to protection
against abuses by business entities.").
186. Cf. Triponel, supra note 13, at 863 (discussing the affirmative duty of the
United States and France to protect citizens from human-rights violations,
indicating they have an interest in holding violators liable).
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corporate-complicity liability because the existence of the trend
tends to reduce concern that imposing such liability is in any
way improper. This Note proposes a framework for when these
states should hold corporations liable for complicit human-
rights violations and explains why universal jurisdiction is the
mechanism that is most likely to succeed in this respect, at least
until the Rome Statute is revised.
1. When Should Corporations be Held Liable?
The three main types of aiding-and-abetting liability are
direct, indirect, and silent.'87 Companies may be found directly
liable when they "knowingly assist or encourage human rights
abuses by others."'88  If Anvil had provided the vehicles and
drivers to the DRC military without an element of coercion, it
would have been an example of knowing assistance. Another
example of direct aiding and abetting is Unocal. Unocal hired
the military to protect its property interests along its pipeline.
The mere hiring of the military to protect property interests
might not be sufficient to establish direct aiding-and-abetting
liability, but there is evidence that Unocal had knowledge that
the Myanmar military systematically utilized forced labor and
displaced locals, 89 and that Unocal nonetheless maintained and
encouraged the military to protect the pipeline. 9 °
If Unocal did not directly assist or encourage the military to
commit human-rights abuses, however, it might be an example
of indirect aiding and abetting. Indirect aiding and abetting is
when a "company benefits from human-rights abuses committed
by someone else, even if the company did not authorize, direct,
or have prior knowledge of the activities."'' Anvil's actions
could also be seen as indirect aiding and abetting. Although
187. The Global Compact, supra note 114, at Princ. 2 (listing direct, beneficial,
and silent complicity as the three types of complicity in a human-rights context);
Complicity Report, supra note 127, 58 (defining beneficial complicity as a company
benefiting directly from human-rights abuses committed by someone else).
188. Anthony P. Ewing, Understanding the Global Compact Human Rights
Principles, in EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS PRACTICE 28, 39 (2003),
available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues-doc/human-rights/Resources/embeddin
g.pdf.
189. See supra note 99.
190. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Unocals
President as saying "[i]f forced labor goes hand and glove with the military yes there
will be more forced labor.").
191. Triponel, supra note 13, at 900.
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Anvil did not instruct the DRC military to protect its property or
give the military its equipment for the purpose of carrying out
human-rights abuses, its mine was protected through the use of
Anvil vehicles and drivers, and the military's actions were taken
as a result of the rebels approaching Anvil's mine.192 Khulumani
also could be seen as example of indirect aiding and abetting
since the companies were accused of financially benefiting from
South Africa's national policy of apartheid.
It is more likely, however, that Khulumani is an example of
silent aiding and abetting. Silent aiding and abetting occurs
when a corporation knows that human-rights violations are
occurring but does not do anything to rectify or stop the
situation.'93 An example of silent complicity is paying taxes in a
country where human-rights violations are occurring, mere
presence in a country, or silence in the face of human-rights
abuses."'
For the purposes of universal jurisdiction, corporations
should be held liable, at a minimum, when they engage in direct
aiding and abetting of human-rights violations. It might prove
too difficult to hold corporations liable under a looser standard
in an already controversial doctrine such as universal
jurisdiction. Considerations such as these may have contributed
to Australia's decision not to pursue the Anvil case.'95 Courts
have been most willing to find that corporations violated human
rights when there is evidence that the corporation solicited the
service of the offender, as in Unocal, used prisoners for forced
labor, such as Krupp, or supplied the offending materials to the
perpetrator, such as in Zyklon B.
Universal jurisdiction should also be used in instances
where corporations indirectly aid and abet human-rights
violations. For example, if Unocal had been unaware that the
military was committing human-rights violations, it would still
be reasonable to find them liable if due diligence could have
192. See McBeth, supra note 65, at 136 n.41 (explaining that Anvil issued a
press release in the days following the incident assuring investors that the DRC
government promised Anvil the situation would be resolved); id. at 136 (explaining
that there is no conclusive evidence Anvil was involved in the operation, but that
Anvil did provide logistical support for the military and likely had prior knowledge
of the operation).
193. Triponel, supra note 13, at 902.
194. Ruggie Report, supra note 116, 77.
195. The Anvil case is further complicated by Anvil's claim that the DRC
military ordered it to turn over its vehicles in accordance with national law. See
McBeth, supra note 65, at 134-35.
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reasonably alerted them to the reality of the situation; that is, if
they had "constructive knowledge."'9 6 The penalty for indirect
corporate complicity could be less severe than that for an
otherwise identical case of direct corporate complicity to reflect
the different degree of culpability.
It might be risky. to use a nascent doctrine such as universal
jurisdiction in this context, however.'97 Although the Second
Circuit was willing to find the defendants in Khulumani liable,
it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would have reached
the same conclusion. It might have concluded that the
corporations were merely present in the country and silent in
the face of human-rights abuses: according to the Ruggie Report,
silent complicity will almost never give rise to liability.
98
Corporations should not be held liable for silent complicity.
To do so would expose each business in the offending state to
liability, unless each somehow manifested its objection. This
could have severe economic ramifications. Opponents of
corporate aiding-and-abetting liability argue that corporate-
complicity liability could have a chilling effect on foreign direct
investment,'99 and the low threshold required for silent aiding
and abetting increases the likelihood of such a chilling effect.
Holding corporations liable for direct aiding and abetting
would comport with the standard of aiding and abetting set
forth by the ICTY. It would fulfill the actus reus requirement of
encouragement or practical assistance, and the "actual and
constructive knowledge" mens rea requirement. Likewise,
indirect aiding-and-abetting liability would fulfill the actus reus
and mens rea requirements as well. Finding "encouragement or
practical assistance" to fulfill the actus reus element might
prove challenging, but encouragement might be found if the
corporation knew that human-rights violations were occurring,
196. Furthermore, the human-rights abuses might not have occurred at all if it
had not been for Unocal's request for military support.
197. See Ruggie Report, supra note 116, T 78 (suggesting that only deriving
benefits from a human-rights abuse is not likely to bring legal liability, but is likely
to negatively affect public perception of the company).
198. Id. 77.
199. Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650,
674-75 (1992) (noting that corporations often seek investment opportunities in
developing states that do not significantly regulate business); see also Dominic
Bencivenga, Human Rights Abuses: Suits Attempt to Extend Liability to
Corporations, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 1997, at 5 (reporting that Unocal's general counsel
believes that the ATCA suit against Unocal could have a "chilling effect" on foreign
direct investment because it would negate due diligence efforts).
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or were likely to occur, on its behalf (e.g., the protection of its
mine from a local uprising, as in Anvil), even absent an
agreement between the corporation and the government to
provide security measures. Since domestic courts such as those
in the United States in ATCA actions look to the ICTY and the
ICTR when establishing their own aiding-and-abetting
standards, it would help establish a clear, uniform standard.
Starting with a narrow application would help establish the
viability of the concept and allow it to expand as it develops. It
would not be contrary to the "purpose" standard in the Rome
Statute, since the definition of "purpose" has not been
established by the ICC.
Some states' domestic legislation might include crimes in
addition those listed in the Rome Statute that could potentially
be used to hold corporations liable."° Corporations should only
be held liable for the gravest of crimes under state universal-
jurisdiction statutes, such as piracy, genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and torture. These crimes have been
established to be those widely recognized in customary
international law as the most egregious-the primary
justification for universal jurisdiction. They have been
recognized in instruments such as the Genocide Convention,
Geneva Conventions, and Torture Convention. Exceeding these
limited crimes would make justifying the use of universal
jurisdiction more difficult.
Finally, a threshold problem is determining when corporate
liability is triggered.2' This implicates the doctrines of
respondeat superior, parent-subsidiary liability, and "piercing
the corporate veil," among others."2 In the United States, for
200. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina's criminal code includes the
devaluation of domestic currency, the unlawful issuance of money, and the forced
conversion to another nationality in its definition of war crimes. Criminal Code of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. 173(i)(d) and (f), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/criminal-code-of-bih.pdf. These are not present in
Article 8 of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 36, art. 8.
201. A corporation is incapable of acting independently of individual, natural
persons. Corporate criminality, therefore, requires the action of a corporate actor.
202. See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against
Multinational Corporations Under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural
Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SuPp. 493, 494 (2002) (discussing the application of
limited liability and corporate responsibility as applied to parent-subsidiary
relationships); David Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends,
Developments and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis, 10
N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 31, 41 (1985) (explaining that a parent company normally
is not subject to liability unless in a way that makes the subsidiary and the parent
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example, corporate liability can be triggered by the actions of
any employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior.2"3 In
the United Kingdom, by contrast, the corporate actor must be
shown to represent the "directing mind and will" of the company
(also known as the "alter ego" approach").2" These questions are
beyond the scope of this Note, but, at a minimum, the actions
and policies of head management should trigger corporate
liability. For example, in Zyklon B, the president of the
company was found to have committed war crimes." 5 Likewise,
in Unocal, the corporation was charged along with its president
and its CEO and chairman."6 Courts have therefore been
willing to find corporations liable for actions committed by their
head management, and often impose stricter penalties for the
actions of corporate management than for those of lower-
ranking employees.2 7 However, limiting corporate liability to
the actions of only head management would allow many
corporate human-rights violations to go unpunished.
2. Corporate Liability via Universal Jurisdiction
Corporations should be held liable under universal
jurisdiction because its use does not encounter many of the
difficulties inherent in other bodies or methods of law, such as
special tribunals, soft-law instruments, and CSR.
The ICTY and the ICTR special tribunals encountered
myriad problems during the course of the trials. While many of
these problems were found in both tribunals, the problems
encountered by the ICTR are sufficient to demonstrate why
one and the same).
203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2000); Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L. REV. 1215,
1219-20 (2003).
204. See, e.g., 11(1) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE
AND PROCEDURE, 38 (4th ed. 2006 Reissue) ("A corporation is vicariously liable for
a crime committed by its servant or agent in the course of his employment or agency
in the same circumstances as an employer or principal who is a natural person");
H.L. Bolton (Eng'g) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons, 1 Q.B.D. 159, 172 (1957)
("[Dlirectors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the
company ... control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state
of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such."); see Khanna, supra note
203, at 1222(discussing the alter ego approach).
205. See supra text accompanying note 88.
206. The defendants were Robert C. Beach, Chairman and CEO, and John F.
Imle, President. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
207. Khanna, supra note 203, at 1220.
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special tribunals should not be the sole means of holding
corporations liable."8
First, the ICTR did not have enough resources to
adequately prosecute the number of people accused of
committing war crimes."9 The ICTR could only handle a
fraction of the claims filed, and therefore was able to prosecute
only the most notorious and high-ranking offenders." '  In
addition, the process was extremely time consuming and the
financial cost per defendant was approximately $80 million.2 '
The ICTR had a limited duration under its mandate, and the
number of defendants awaiting trial far exceeded the ability of
the tribunal to try them. At some point, issues of due process
arise if detainees must wait years to be tried for their crimes.
These difficulties could be one reason that victims sought
redress in other fora, such as in the 4 of Butare, where the
victims used the Belgian universal-jurisdiction statute to bring
their claims.2"2 This demonstrates how universal jurisdiction
may be used to hold the violators of internationally recognized
norms responsible for their actions when these violators might
otherwise slip through the cracks. If Belgium had not
prosecuted the 4 of Butare, it is unlikely they would have been
prosecuted by the ICTR.
The same rationale shows why universal jurisdiction is the
best method for holding corporations liable. Since corporations
are not subject to criminal proceedings in many states, they are
able to slip through the "governance gap" in the justice system.
Even under some far-reaching civil universal-jurisdiction
statutes, such as the ATCA, courts need to establish personal
jurisdiction over defendants before a case may be heard.2"3
Therefore, universal jurisdiction without a jurisdictional
requirement, such as that set forth in the ICC, provides the
means to hold corporations accountable, while allowing states to
prosecute offenders of grave crimes.
The ICC also reflects a similar governance gap. The
208. Notwithstanding that the ICTY and the ICTR did not have jurisdiction over
legal persons, these problems may arise in future tribunals.
209. See generally Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in
Rwanda, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41 (2005) (providing a detailed account of the
problems the ICTR encountered).
210. Id. at 44-45.
211. Id.at46.
212. See supra note 50 for background on the 4 of Butare.
213. Triponel, supra note 13, at 905.
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differences between the civil-law and common-law countries
prevented corporations from being included in the statute. That
the discussion was part of the Rome Statute's drafting process
reflects the recognition that corporate liability for human-rights
violations is becoming a reality. The Ruggie Report, specifically
addressing the issue of corporate liability and human rights,
calls for clearer standards. As states enact domestic legislation
and investigate and possibly prosecute corporations for their
complicit activities, corporate-complicity liability will
undoubtedly be on the agenda when the ICC is up for revision in
2009."4 The fundamental gap between common- and civil-law
countries will likely remain, however, so the ICC might be
forced to put the issue on hold yet again. Domestic litigation
would be the gap-filler in the meantime.
In addition to filling the governance gap, universal
jurisdiction is the method most likely to achieve corporate
observation of human rights. Voluntary methods, such as soft-
law instruments and CSR, are not adequate deterrents alone.
The OECD Guidelines, Global Compact, and the UN Norms are
all positive steps toward creating a global standard of corporate
conduct in regard to human rights. However, all of these soft-
law instruments have encountered functional difficulties and
faced criticism.
The OECD Guidelines are the most widely applicable
standards relating to corporate responsibilities and human-
rights obligations."5 Yet, they only mention human rights once
throughout the entire instrument."6 They have been criticized
for lacking "specificity" and for falling behind the voluntary
practices of many corporations, i.e., for being outdated."7
Furthermore, the Guideline's regulatory mechanism, the
National Contact Points (NCPs), is widely perceived to be
ineffective.2 1 8 NCPs have been criticized for having a bias
toward companies, lacking transparency, efficiency, and the
214. Complicity Report, supra note 127, 34 n.17.
215. Ruggie Report, supra note 116, 46.
216. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 19 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (Enterprises should "[riespect the
human rights of those affected by their activities ....").
217. Ruggie Report, supra note 116, 46 (encouraging revision to the OECD
guidelines).
218. The OECD Guidelines required its signatories to establish an NCP to
provide a forum for grievances. Id. 98.
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resources to conduct investigations." 9
The Global Compact, while a great achievement for getting
3,700 corporations to commit to its provisions, is not widely
recognized by the business community the way the UDHR is.
67,000 transnational corporations have yet to commit.
Furthermore, its scope is limited; it only contains ten principles
that corporations voluntarily agree to follow. However,
corporations "can affect virtually all internationally recognized
rights.""22 While the Global Compact is a good start, it is not
sufficient to ensure corporations' observation of human rights.
Similarly, the UN Norms have faced criticism for essentially
extending the duties of states to companies,21 and for assigning
human-rights responsibilities to companies in ways that are
difficult to measure.222
Ultimately, soft-law recommendations, while an important
step toward corporate human-rights responsibility, are not
capable of adjudicating human-rights violations.223 Until these
instruments become widely embraced and enforceable,224 they
are not likely to produce the type of compliance that
adjudication under state universal-jurisdiction statutes would
achieve. This is not to suggest that universal jurisdiction is
exempt from criticism and potential implementation problems,
but rather that it is the method most likely to achieve corporate
compliance with human-rights norms under the present
circumstances.
The CSR movement, while indicating that corporations are
increasingly aware of liability, risks such liability merely by
conducting business, and will not by itself achieve corporate
observation of human rights. Corporate self-monitoring suffers
from inherent internal conflicts of interest. In addition, many
219. Id. But see id. 99 (discussing innovative solutions to these problems that
some NCP's have invented).
220. Id. 9 6.
221. Id. 51-53 (arguing that defining a limited list of rights linked to
responsibilities is too imprecise and that the correct way to do it would be to define
specific responsibilities of companies with regard to all rights, since there are "few if
any internationally recognized rights business cannot impact").
222. For example, measurements based on "spheres of influence." See
Complicity Report, supra note 127, T 7-8 (defining spheres of influence); Ruggie
Report, supra note 116, $$ 51, 67-72 (criticizing the sphere of influence approach).
223. David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 67
(2005) (noting that the UN Norms apply to all companies, but are not legally binding
and only act as guidelines for interpreting existing law and summarizing
international practice) [hereinafter Weissbrodt, Business].
224. Id.
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corporate policies primarily address labor issues and barely
mention human-rights commitments.225 Many voluntary codes
do not have mechanisms for ensuring compliance or even
implementation.226  Unocal exemplifies problems with self-
regulation, since Unocal's human-rights policy stated that it
observed the UDHR.227 This case may be seen as a failure of
corporate voluntarism based on self-imposed, non-binding
norms.228  Furthermore, since corporate human-rights
obligations are relatively new, many corporations only recently
have joined initiatives like the Global Compact and are only
beginning to develop human-rights policies. 29  Universal
jurisdiction provides a means to prevent corporations that have
not adopted internal human-rights policies or agreed to any soft-
law instruments to avoid human-rights obligations.
3. State Domestic Courts Exercising Universal Jurisdiction
Provide the Best Forum
Domestic court systems exercising universal jurisdiction
pursuant to their ICC obligations that recognize corporate
aiding-and-abetting liability would provide the best forum to
prosecute corporations, mainly because many of them have the
expertise and knowledge to deal with a complex and developing
area of the law. Regardless of whether it is a civil system, such
as the ATCA, or a criminal system, such as Australia's domestic
legislation, domestic judiciaries are likely be the most
experienced and best prepared to handle the cases. Ideally, the
ICC will eventually include liability for corporations in its
statute, but until civil-law and common-law countries resolve
their differences, national court systems can fill the gap using
domestic legislation, pursuant to their obligations to prevent
grave human-rights violations. 3
225. Id. at 24.
226. Id.
227. See Engle, supra note 162, at 112.
228. Kielsgard, supra note 163, at 190; see also id. at 191 n.37 (listing other
corporations that were implicated in the commission of human-rights violations
abroad in apparent violation of their corporate human-rights policies).
229. Cf. Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 158, 17.
230. Even in countries that do not recognize corporate criminal liability, it would
be appropriate to create punishments in civil proceedings for corporate defendants
that are equivalent to criminal sanctions for criminal aiding and abetting. This
approach has been taken in respect to corruption and bribery by legal entities.
OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
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The experience of domestic courts will be instructive as to
how to approach criminal liability at the international level.
Thus, much like the U.S. Supreme Court often lets issues
bounce around the circuit courts before hearing a case, the ICC
can gain valuable information by examining the practice of state
proceedings involving corporate liability under implementing
legislation. There are practical and procedural problems with
this, of course. Multiple states exercising universal jurisdiction
to try grave crimes increases the likelihood of concurrent
proceedings, inconsistent outcomes, and, for criminal
proceedings, double jeopardy.23' States may interpret the ICC in
different ways, which could lead to competing definitions and
applications. There could be corruption at the domestic level,
thus making trials a sham. States could reduce the likelihood of
these issues through the use of various legal doctrines such as
international comity, forum non conveniens, collateral estoppel,
or res judicata.232
The way domestic litigation provides a forum for trying
corporations can be seen as the mirror image of the system of
complementarity. In this instance, the ICC is unable to
prosecute corporate violators of human rights, and so domestic
forums are fulfilling their obligations as ICC signatories by
Business Transactions, art. 3, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20 (Apr. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/418/38028044.pdf ("In the event that; under the legal
system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that
Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and
dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions .. "). Imposing
similar punishments on corporate defendants in civil universal jurisdiction
proceedings would increase deterrence, and perhaps obviate the need for states
recognizing corporate criminal liability to exercise criminal universal jurisdiction,
since one of the justifications for universal jurisdiction-slipping through the
governance gap to avoid liability for a crime-would be diminished. Germany, for
example, which does not recognize criminal liability for corporations, has enacted
civil punishments for bribery that are similar to criminal sanctions. See generally
OECD, Germany: Phase 2, Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the
1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, at 26-29 (June 3, 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/9/2958732.pdf.
231. See generally Terracino, supra note 145 (discussing the potential problems
associated with ICC implementation legislation).
232. For a discussion of forum non conveniens, see generally Kathryn Lee Boyd,
The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in U.S. Human
Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41 (1998); Duval-Major, supra note 199; Robert
C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IowA L.
REV 53 (1984). Cf. Duval-Major, supra note 199, at 650-51 (noting that the doctrine
of forum non conveniens permits corporations to evade liability).
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allowing prosecution of these crimes.
Universal jurisdiction covers a very limited range of crimes,
those recognized by the international community to be the most
egregious.23 3 States have an interest in adjudicating them to
assure that violators of these crimes are not able to slip through
the governance gap while the international community
establishes the best and most comprehensive set of standards
governing corporate human-rights responsibilities.
III. CONCLUSION
The development of international jurisprudence indicates
that states are becoming increasingly willing to hold
corporations accountable for their complicit actions abroad when
their actions violate established human-rights standards,
especially in instances of genocide, war crimes, torture, and
crimes against humanity. International law has developed
rapidly in the past seventy years, and each treaty, tribunal, and
convention learns from and expands upon the previous one.
Corporate criminal liability is the next logical step in the
development of international law. Globalization has occurred at
a rapid pace, and the institutions of the law are valiantly trying
to adjust to and reflect new interactions between state and non-
state actors. As states enact ICC-implementing domestic
legislation, universal jurisdiction will enable states to hold
corporations liable in ways that these treaties do not in their
present form. Universal jurisdiction, although in its nascent
stages, has enormous potential to shape and define the
emerging recognition of corporate-complicity liability.
233. See note 8 supra for a list of crimes recognized under universal jurisdiction.

